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Abstract 
Service delivery remains a pressing issue throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Recently, the focus of government policies on meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals has increased attention on better provision of services. At 
present, however, services in Africa lag significantly behind those of other 
developing countries and are considerably more expensive than elsewhere (Foster 
& Briceno; 2010). This paper explores the factors affecting service delivery in SSA 
and compares public services provision to private sector service delivery, as well as 
the impact of both on development. The paper unfolds in three steps: After a brief 
review of the current condition of services, I will examine the shortlist of identified 
factors contributing to the current state of services and conclude with brief 
recommendations. I have excluded South Africa in my analysis because it is more 
developed than other countries in the region. This is by no means intended to be 
an exhaustive list of causal factors and capacity constraints allow for only partial 
considerations of primarily, water, and to a lesser extent, sanitation and electricity. 
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On almost all measures of infrastructure coverage, African countries lag 
behind other countries in the developing world (Yepes, Pierce, and Foster 2008). 
The gap is particularly large for coverage of paved roads, telephone main lines, and 
power generation. In these three areas, African nations have been expanding services 
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much more slowly than other developing nations, setting the stage for an ever-
increasing gap unless changes are initiated. Power poses the biggest challenge, as 
thirty countries face regular power cuts and premiums for emergency power are high. 
According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report, in 2000 only 44% of the 
population had access to safe water. In contrast, 67% of the population in East Asia 
and the Pacific had access to safe water, and 65% had access in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (UNDP; 2003). From 2003 to 2006, barely any progress had been 
made; almost half of the SSA population still had no access to an improved water 
source and two thirds had no access to sanitation. In fact, coverage of household 
services has hardly improved since 1990.  
In 2000, the member states of the United Nations agreed to a set of eight 
development goals aimed at eradicating poverty, to be achieved by 2015. Not only is 
Africa unlikely to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for water and 
sanitation, but universal access to these and other household services is more than 50 
years away in most African countries based on current trends (Banerjee, Wodon, and 
others 2008). While the perception exists that service delivery is higher in urban areas 
compared to rural areas because rural areas are inaccessible, cross-country statistical 
regressions of the determinants of access to water and sanitation do not support this 
(Mamba; 2008). Recently, the focus of government policies on meeting the MDGs 
has increased attention on better provision of services (UNDP; 2006). Improved 
service delivery through investment in water and sanitation is necessary to achieve 
the MDG of halving the number of people without sustainable access to clean water 
and sanitation. Privatisation is being promoted as a solution to the current dire state 
of services; evidence shows, however, that this is not a panacea, especially where 
expectations of African governments and the private sector incentives do not align. 
In order for the continent to achieve its economic potential, increase growth, and 
progress from being an exporter of raw materials to a producer of finished goods, 
service delivery must improve. 
This paper considers the lack of both funding and accountability as causes of 
poor service provision.   The status quo in one African city, Lagos, is then examined 
as an illustrative example of the relationship between public and private sector 
service delivery. The current state of public sector services and the push towards 
privatisation through public-private partnerships will then be evaluated, prior to 
briefly touching on other factors affecting delivery and my conclusions. 
 
2. The Funding Shortfall 
 
The key sources of funding for the provision of water, sanitation and 
electricity services include government tax revenues, usage fee revenues and aid, but 
the funding allocated to these services is not adequate. Public spending in Sub-
Saharan Africa for water and sanitation services typically equals less than 0.5% of 
GDP and is as low as 0.1% in some countries, such as Zambia (Wolf; ECA Research 
2007). Average sanitation investments amount to 12–15% of total water and 
sanitation expenditure (AFDB and OECD, 2007; UNDP, 2006). Compounding the 
problems raised by low budgets, inefficiency and bottlenecks often lead to actual 
spending of only about two-thirds of the budget allocated to infrastructure. Some 
governments have allocated more resources to certain areas of infrastructure than 
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would appear to be warranted (Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster; 2008). The 
result is an overall funding shortfall for meeting Africa’s service needs; there is a gap 
between the estimated infrastructure spending needs and the available resources. 
Cuts in the percentage of aid allocated to water and sanitation, from 7.2% to 
3.3% of total ODA1 between 1996 and 2002 but up to 4.5% in 2005, have 
exacerbated funding shortfalls (OECD, 2007b).  High aid volatility negatively affects 
countries that depend heavily on aid (Bul´ıˇr and Hamann; 2003). The instability of 
aid disbursements may alter fiscal behaviour, possibly causing a decrease in public 
investment (Lensink and Morrissey; 2000). In principle, aid makes more money 
available for public spending, which in turn should improve service delivery; high 
volatility, however, creates significant challenges for recipient countries with respect 
to the management of resources (Briceno-Garmendia et al; 2004). Also, most project 
aid and donor funding stipulates some form of privatisation, which is not always 
warranted despite the problems with public sector delivery in most countries. In 
Burkina Faso, for example, the existing public services were efficient, making 
privatisation unwarranted, but privatisation was still imposed as a condition of aid. 
Corruption has been a problem in privatised service delivery that is funded by aid 
money as well.  Even when a private company, Lahmeyer, was found guilty of 
corruption related to a water project in Rwanda, the World Bank allowed it to be 
linked to contracts financed by the Bank (Hall and Lobina; 2006). Further, where 
privatisation has been resisted by a government, the donor or development bank 
funding gets cut, as it was in Guinea.2 We must also consider that higher spending 
might also not lead to a proportional increase in the quality of service delivery where 
corruption exists (Briceno-Garmendia et al; 2004). 
 
3. Lack of Accountability 
 
 Empirical studies show a strong correlation between service availability and 
the extent to which citizens select their own governments. The availability of services 
is also strongly correlated with the quality of government regulations (Mamba; 2008). 
This suggests that the failure to provide public services can be attributed, at least in 
part, to low accountability environments, in which politicians are able to misallocate 
public funds; division among voters on social and ideological grounds could also be a 
contributing factor. Corruption results in input shortages, price increases, decreased 
spending on maintenance, and reduced government revenue (Wolf; 2007). Greater 
political accountability has been shown to improve public services and reduce 
corruption in Uganda, where transparency about government transfers to local 
spending units has reduced misappropriation of funds by as much as 90% (World 
Bank; 2003).  
One recent trend aimed at increasing participation and transparency in public 
service delivery is decentralization. Decentralization is associated with better access 
to water and sanitation in rural areas, which might reflect both better targeting and 
accountability at the local level and the availability of small-scale technical solutions. 
However, obstacles to decentralization are numerous because the tax base in rural 
                                                
1 Updated figures unavailable. 
2 In 1999, the Word Bank suspended funding for Guinea until privatisation  
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areas is weak and vertical imbalances in technical and administrative capacities are 
large (Bardhan; 2002). 
 
4. Public and Private Sector Delivery 
 
4.1 The Status Quo in Lagos, Nigeria 
 
In many places in the developing world, a large share of service activity 
comes from private sector and community participation; sometimes this kind of 
participation accounts for more output than the public sector, as is the case in 
Nigeria’s commercial capital of Lagos.  Limited investment in water and sanitation 
infrastructure has resulted in a situation in which only a minority of households in 
Lagos are directly connected to the Water Board system, while the rest of the city 
relies on private connections or shared, community-funded access. At that time, 
Williams and Walsh reported that the city’s arrangements had produced huge 
disparities in both the cost and availability of drinking water – there was a plentiful 
supply to public and commercial buildings and high-income residential areas, but 
low-income areas were “served by sparse standpipes, and some sections are not 
served at all” (Williams and Walsh, 1968).  
Today, the situation appears to have deteriorated. Even highbrow areas have 
little access to public services. Lagos has become a self-service city in which little is 
expected from government, and many social and everyday services are obtained 
through unstructured local and private negotiations and sourcing within the private 
community. Deficiencies in water and sanitation provision continue to provide some 
of the most striking manifestations of the city’s worsening infrastructure crisis 
(Gandy; 2006). Gandy asserts that less than 5% of Lagos households have piped 
water connections, a fall from around 10% in the 1960s) and less than 1% are linked 
to a closed sewer system. For those lucky enough to have piped connections, the 
bane of their daily lives is the frequent power shortages. Most of the city depends on 
wells, boreholes, water tankers, illegal connections and street vendors (Expunobi, 
2001; Sulaimon, 2000). Besides providing one’s own water source, one must also 
obtain one’s own power source to access that water, since power is needed to pump 
water from boreholes and wells. Inhabitants of slum settlements must choose 
between polluted wells or tanker water distributed by intermediaries at high, volatile 
prices (Gandy; 2006). This state of affairs is not idiosyncratic to Lagos, as public 
services enterprises in many SSA cities still face importunate financial and 
organisational problems including gross inconsistency in access, ineffective collection 
of rates and limited investment in new facilities.  
 
4.2 Public Service Provision 
 
Most public service enterprises in SSA have been unsuccessful in providing 
reliable water supply and sanitation services. Government monopoly in service 
provision has resulted in lack of accountability and community ownership in the 
planning and implementation of infrastructure projects, poor management and 
sustainability, low quality and limited options. A major challenge for the provision of 
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water and sanitation is capacity constraints with respect to planning, management 
and implementation, especially at the local level. Measures including the restructuring 
of ministries, matching of resource allocations with policy commitments and 
establishing national monitoring and evaluation frameworks are needed to improve 
access to water and sanitation (AMCOW et al., 2006). Additionally, the service 
sector’s low revenue collection leaves it heavily dependent on aid funding with 
multiple fragmented donor projects, which makes planning at the sector level very 
difficult (Slaymaker and Newborne, 2004). As discussed above, poor service delivery 
in Nigerian cities is largely attributed to poor planning, but in some cases good urban 
planning policies are undermined by poor implementation, as seen in Abuja. These 
problems are compounded by population growth and the increasing rate of rural 
urban migration without a corresponding expansion of basic social infrastructure. A 
common sight in most Nigerian urban centres is the indiscriminate dumping of 
refuse in open spaces because waste is seldom collected from the depots, in part 
because of the lack of sufficient equipment. The situation is also aggravated by a lack 
of concern over industrial waste (Omar, 2009). 
The dominance of public enterprises has led to a monopolistic market 
environment, and the ensuing dearth of competition has been blamed for 
inefficiency and the dreadful state of these services. Moreover, these enterprises 
often price services below cost, but these prices are still beyond the reach of low-
income households. For utilities, only 70%–90% of billed revenues are typically 
collected, and distribution losses can be twice that. According to household surveys, 
about 40% of those connected to utility services do not appear to be paying for 
them, a share that rises to 65% for a significant minority of countries (World Bank; 
2010). These losses are material at the national level, absorbing 0.5% of GDP on the 
Sub-Saharan African average, or $3.4 billion annually (Briceño-Garmendia et al., 
2008). Indeed, provision of services at below cost prices contributes to the lack of 
capital and low levels of investment in infrastructure (World Bank Report, 2010). 
Low payment recovery and subsidies granted to large industrial customers hurt the 
poor masses, which have to pay higher prices and a higher percentage of their 
income towards services. It is unrealistic to expect the urban poor to pay sufficient 
charges to make needed infrastructure extensions viable, let alone profitable. In 2009 
in Uganda, water payments accounted for 22% of the average income of urban 
households in the poorest 20% of the income distribution (Wolf, 2009). In Nairobi 
and Accra, the prices paid in low-income settlements with little access to the public 
provision are around 8 times higher than those paid by high-income residents (Wolf, 
2007). In general, the poor pay higher prices for water because they tend not to be 
connected to public services and thus must rely on expensive private alternatives. 
As highlighted above, a major impediment to the provision of basic water 
and sanitation is the lack of new infrastructure coupled with insufficient maintenance 
of existing services. Governments have been encouraged to consider the 
commercialization of public services through privatisation in order to lead expansion 
schemes. However, many challenges are faced in attracting investments from the 
international private sector. In comparison to other continents, Africa has a low 
overall population density (36 people per sq. km), low rates of urbanization (35%), 
relatively rapid rates of urban growth (3.6% annually), a relatively large number of 
landlocked countries (15), and numerous small economies (World Bank, 2010). 
Population densities in African cities are relatively low by global standards and do 
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not benefit from large economies of agglomeration in the provision of infrastructure 
services. As a result, the costs of providing a basic infrastructure package can be 
twice as much as in other developing cities (Dorosh and others; 2008). The 
explanation for Africa’s higher prices sometimes lies in genuinely higher costs and 
sometimes in high profits. 
 
4.3 Private Sector Service Provision 
 
While aid donors have encouraged the involvement of the private sector, 
especially in the water sector, they have also cut their own contributions to the sector 
to a point far greater than the actual investments made by the private sector (Hall 
and Lobina; 2010). Development banks and the donor community have pushed for 
forms of privatisation owing to the school of thought that through partnering with 
the private sector, the potential political issues of full privatization could be evaded, 
access to new technology and expertise could be gained and, imperatively, access to 
capital needed for vital infrastructure expansion would materialise. Generally, the use 
of the term ‘privatisation’ is avoided and the term ‘Public Private Partnership’ (PPP) 
is used to connote the partnership between private and public sector.  
The most common forms of PPP globally are: (1) management contracts 
offered to private firms to manage the operations of service delivery for a fee over a 
short term period, (2) concessions contracts granted to private enterprises to fully 
run, invest in and expand services for a profit over a long term period, typically 
between 20 to 30 years, and (3) lease contracts by which a private company is 
brought in to run and maintain an existing service system but with no responsibility 
for expansion or new investments. Thus far, PPPs in the water sector in Africa have 
not produced the desired results. Several schemes have had a “negative impact on 
the poorest of the poor by restricting their access to clean supplies due to high 
tariffs” (Ogunbiyi, 2004). In SSA, there have been mainly lease contract PPPs and 
only a handful of concessions granted; three for water and electricity services in Cape 
Verde, Gabon and Mali, and two others covering water and sanitation in South 
Africa. None of these cases have seen their expected success. Mali terminated a 20-
year concession prematurely in 2005, and Cape Verde proposed renationalisation, 
both following their private partners’ under-investments (World Market Analysis, 
2005). In Gabon, there were problems with the concessioner Veolia3, also owing to 
underinvestment, consequent power shortages and poor water quality, which 
resulted in the country’s first typhoid epidemic in 2004 (Africa News, 2005). In 2005, 
the IFC stepped in to provide financing and guarantees needed for investments over 
the next five-year period. Subsequently in 2010, the PPP has proposed a 512 million 
Euro investment plan to be realised before 2017,4 mostly from government and 
development funding.  
The two mildly successful PPP stories are lease contracts in Senegal and Cote 
d’Ivoire.  Their success is due in part to the long duration of their contracts, but also 
to the fact that, in both cases, the government has financed investments and new 
connections. In Senegal, the contract led to an impressive 35% increase in water 
                                                
3 In 1997, Societe d’Electricite et d’Eaux de Gabon gave a 20-yr. contract to Veolia.  
4 Oxford Business Group, 2010. 
40 Consilience 
 
connections (Hall and Lobina, 2010). In general, other leases throughout the sub-
continent have been much less successful, as evidenced by the Veolia leases in 
Gambia, Guinea and Niger. With the exception of Niger,5 where the contract 
continues to be in place despite water shortages alongside price increases, the other 
two leases have been terminated because of poor performance, contractual 
omissions and disputes over investment responsibilities. Similarly, a funding-
conditionality-imposed lease contract in Tanzania was terminated by the government 
after only two years due to the private partner’s failure to meet its investment 
commitments (Action Aid, 2005).  
 
5. Other Factors 
 
There are many other factors that are not discussed in this paper; this does 
not imply, however, that they are any less important. Some of these factors include a 
lack of skilled and professional manpower in government to handle service issues 
and inadequate related services. Better roads, for example, could make it cheaper to 
build and maintain water and sanitation facilities in rural areas (Gwilliam et al., 2008). 
There is some evidence that asymmetric information plays an important role in 
public service delivery; research in Uganda by the World Bank found that countries 
with better media coverage could have more efficient public service provision 
(Svensson and Reinikka, 2004). Another contributory factor could be a lack of 
political will or political pull amongst the public: because most citizens have never 
experienced functional public services, the impetus for political mobilisation to effect 
change is hardly existent. Unfortunately, the long-standing state of woeful service 
delivery has given rise to a local mafia class that provides water, fuel, and other 





In conclusion, weaknesses in service-delivery can be attributed to a number 
of issues. Optimistic expectations for investments by private companies have been 
dashed. These expectations led to reductions in development financing and aid, 
which has now exacerbated the poor state of infrastructure in SSA. Imperatively, the 
manner in which provision of basic infrastructure services is dispensed to meet 
demands will determine the level of economic activity and, in turn, the overall 
development of a nation. Delivery of public services is also essential in order to meet 
the MDGs. In particular, improved health and environmental sustainability as well as 
widespread access to clean water, sanitation and other basic public services are 
proving to be fundamental preconditions (OECD, 2004). The current needs 
necessitate crucial investments in expanding delivery and improving infrastructure. It 
is recommended that in partnering with private sector operators, governments 
should enter apt contractual arrangements that are compatible with socioeconomic 
criteria and objectives, with an emphasis on the specific needs of poor consumers. In 
                                                
5 Africa Research Bulletin. 2004. 
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the medium term, the private sector is not expected to fill the financing gap in 
infrastructure in Africa (Thoenen, 2007; AfDB and OECD, 2007). 
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